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Abstract
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre–project investigations in the pres-
ence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurer’s problem, we extend
a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral
hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition.
Due to a rent effect, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent
cost overruns and too little information acquisition to prevent false project cancelations.
Moral hazard mitigates the distortions related to cost overruns yet exacerbates those
related to false negatives. The optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts that
achieves the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition and truthful in-
formation revelation.
Keywords: Information acquisition, procurement, dynamic mechanism design
JEL codes: D82, H57
∗University Bonn, Department of Economics and Hausdorff-Center for Mathematics, Adenauer Allee 24-42,
D-53113 Bonn (Germany), kraehmer@hcm.uni-bonn.de.
†Humboldt-Universita¨t zu Berlin, Institute for Microeconomic Theory, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178 Berlin
(Germany), strauszr@wiwi.hu-berlin.de. We thank the editor, two anonymous referees, Pascal Courty, Peter Eso¨,
Regis Renault and seminar participants in Barcelona, Berlin, Bonn, Cambridge, Heidelberg, Mannheim, Michi-
gan, Munich, Rotterdam. Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support by the DFG (German Science
Foundation) under SFB/TR-15. Roland Strausz further acknowledges support under DFG–grant STR991/2-2.
1
1 Introduction
Practitioners in managing procurement projects stress the importance of pre–project planning.
Based on a number of case studies, Gibson and Hamilton (1994) conclude that “there does exist
a positive, quantifiable relationship between effort expended during the pre-project planning
phase and the ultimate success of a project.”1 The goal of pre–project investigations is to obtain
more accurate cost estimates, which allow the procurer to decide more carefully about whether
to implement the project. In other words, pre–project planning is a process of information ac-
quisition before the final implementation decision is taken.2 The project management literature
not only stresses the importance of effective pre–project planning but also warns procurers to
keep as much control over this process as possible. For instance, Gibson et al. (2006, p.41)
write in their empirical appraisal that procurers frequently “decide to delegate the pre-project
planning process entirely to contractors, often with disastrous results”. Given the importance
of pre–project planning and these observed “disastrous results” from delegation, we develop
and analyze an economic model of pre–project planning to enhance our understanding of this
process.
Our starting point is the observation that the reported “disastrous results” from delegation
point to conflicting interests and incentive problems. Due to the contractor’s superior exper-
tise, we can identify three sources of incentive problems in pre–project investigations. First,
the contractor is already in a better position to estimate the project’s cost from the very out-
set. Hence, the procurer–contractor relationship typically exhibits ex ante adverse selection.
Second, the contractor, as the expert, is often in the better position to evaluate the additional
information which the pre–project investigation reveals. Hence, pre–project investigations lead
to additional adverse selection at an interim stage. Third, the amount of information that
results from pre–investigations will largely depend on the contractor’s own actions such as his
advice and expertise on how to perform the investigations. Hence, pre–project investigations
also involve a moral hazard problem.
1See also, e.g., Turner (1993), Gibson et al. (2006), Ka¨hko¨nen (1999) and Dahlin, Bjelm, and Svensson
(1999).
2Gibson et. al. (1995) define pre–project planning “as the process of developing sufficient strategic informa-
tion for owners to address risk and decide whether to commit resources to maximize the change for a successful
capital facility project”.
2
The presence of these three different types of incentive problems leads us to view the pro-
curement problem as a dynamic mechanism design problem. To capture adverse selection, we
adopt a sequential screening approach as in Courty and Li (2000) and Eso¨ and Szentes (2007b).
To capture moral hazard, we allow for unobservable interim information acquisition by the
agent. Our results are as follows. First, we derive as a benchmark the first–best solution with-
out any incentive problems. In this case, the principal uses pre–investigations to mitigate one
of two implementation errors: If the initial information about the project is favorable and indi-
cates a positive social value, then the principal uses pre–investigation to prevent cost overruns.
For this case, we say that information acquisition prevents false positives (or type I errors).
In contrast, if the initial cost information is unfavorable, then she uses pre–investigations to
correct for a possibly false cancelation of the project. Information acquisition then prevents
false negatives (or type II errors).
Second, we characterize the optimal contract when information acquisition is still observable
but there are adverse selection problems. In this case, the principal implements the optimal
contract by a menu of contracts that offers a fixed price contract and a range of option con-
tracts. The fixed price contract obliges the contractor to carry out the project in all cost
circumstances for a fixed price. The option contract gives the contractor the right to first
conduct a pre–investigation and then decide whether to complete the project for an exercise
price or, alternatively, quit the project. As we will argue in Section 7, option contracts feature
prominently in a range of real world contractual relations and support our analysis.
Third, we treat the case with unobservable information acquisition and characterize the
conditions under which the implied moral hazard problem causes additional agency costs. In
particular, we find that additional agency costs do not arise when the contractor’s additional
information is uncorrelated with his initial information. In general, however, moral hazard does
cause additional agency costs. We demonstrate that, in this case, the principal has to adapt
the contract in ways that leads to bunching and less information acquisition.
Finally, the comparison of the optimal contract under the three different contracting en-
vironments allows us to characterize the systematic distortions in information acquisition and
attribute them to the different incentive problems. We first demonstrate that the adverse selec-
tion problem leads to too much information acquisition to prevent false positives (type I errors)
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and too little information acquisition to prevent false negatives (type II errors). Moreover, we
show that the moral hazard problem unambiguously exacerbates distortions with respect to
type II errors and mitigates distortions with respect to type I errors. As a result, the welfare
effects of the additional moral hazard problem are ambiguous. While the principal always loses
from additional agency costs, the agent’s utility and, in fact, total welfare may go up in the
presence of a moral hazard problem. In this case, the moral hazard problem mitigates some of
the inefficiencies from adverse selection.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on optimal dynamic mechanism design.
This literature studies optimal contract design in environments in which information is privately
revealed to the agents over time.3 A recent paper by Pavan et al. (2008) provides a general
framework that encompasses earlier contributions on dynamic price discrimination (e.g., Baron
and Besanko (1984), Laffont and Tirole (1990, 1996), Battaglini (2005)), or on sequential
screening (e.g. Courty and Li (2000), Dai et al. (2006), Eso¨ and Szentes (2007a, b)). Our
contribution to this literature is to extend the analysis to endogenous information acquisition
with moral hazard.
Our basic setup is most similar to the sequential screening model by Courty and Li (2000)
who study monopolistic price discrimination when consumers are uncertain about their subse-
quent demand but obtain additional information before actual consumption.4 Similar to Courty
and Li (2000), we impose a first order stochastic dominance ranking condition on the family of
the conditional cost distributions conditional on the initial signal.5 A well–known, fundamen-
tal problem is that, unlike in static problems, incentive compatibility in sequential screening
problem cannot be characterized in terms of monotonicity of the allocation rule. Courty and
Li (2000) therefore first uncover necessary conditions for incentive compatibility from “local”
constraints and then use the stochastic dominance ranking to verify implementability. We give
a new proof for the validity of this approach by showing that for deterministic contracts, incen-
tive compatibility can actually be characterized in terms of monotonicity. This property then
allows us to treat the case when information acquisition is endogenous. The optimal contract
3A number of papers deals with the design of efficient mechanisms in dynamic environments. See, e.g., Athey
and Segal (2007a, 2007b), Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2008).
4Eso¨ and Szentes (2007a) extends Courty and Li (2000) to a multi–agent setting.
5In contrast, Dai et al. (2006) study an environment with second order stochastic dominance ranking.
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derived by Courty and Li (2000) also displays a menu of option contracts. Thus, our analysis
makes clear that option contracts are a robust feature of optimal sequential screening contracts
also if information acquisition is endogenous and, possibly, involves moral hazard problems.
In fact, such options not only work to screen consumers, but serve the additional purpose of
inducing information acquisition.
Closely related is also the model by Eso¨ and Szentes (2007b), where the principal can
acquire costly, additional information which only the agent can interpret. We differ from
Eso¨ and Szentes (2007b) in at least three respects: first, in our model it is the agent who
acquires additional information. More importantly, while Eso¨ and Szentes (2007b) restrict
attention to observable information acquisition, we also analyze the natural case when it is
unobservable. This leads to a moral hazard problem that changes the analysis fundamentally.
A final difference is that we characterize and give an intuitive explanation for the distortions
in information acquisition that are implied by adverse selection and moral hazard.6
Our work is also related to the literature on information acquisition in principal–agent
problems (e.g., Lewis and Sappington 1997, Cremer et al. 1998, Kessler 1998, Szalay 2009).
The key difference is that this literature studies the incentives of an agent to acquire private
information before he accepts or rejects the contract. Therefore, there is only a single screening
stage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section
3 discusses the first–best benchmark. In Section 4, we present the principal’s problem. In
Section 5, we solve the principal’s problem when information acquisition is publicly observable
and derive the distortions implied by optimal contracting. In Section 6, we treat the case with
unobservable information acquisition. In Section 7, we discuss empirical implications of the
theory. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
A principal seeks to procure one unit of a good from an agent. The principal’s valuation for
the good is v > 0. There are two periods. In period 1, contracting takes place, and in period
6See also Hoffmann and Inderst (2009), who study the distortions in information acquisition due to adverse
selection only.
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2, the agent produces the good. Before contracting, the agent privately observes a noisy signal
about true costs. Let the noisy signal be given by the random variable γ˜ and let true costs be
given by the random variable c˜. The agent privately observes the realization γ of γ˜, and it is
common knowledge that γ˜ is distributed with distribution function F and density f = F ′ on
the support Γ = [0, γ¯]. We assume that f is strictly positive and differentiable on Γ and that
the hazard rate h(γ) ≡ F (γ)/f(γ) is non–decreasing in γ.
True costs are equal to the signal plus a random shock s˜: c˜ = γ˜ + s˜. The cost shock
has support R and has zero conditional mean so that γ˜ is an unbiased estimate of costs:
E[c˜|γ] = γ + E[s˜|γ] = γ.7 In general, the distribution of c˜ conditional on γ is given by G(·|γ)
with the conditional density g(·|γ).8 We assume that the family {G(·|γ)}γ is ranked in terms
of first order stochastic dominance. That is, G(·|γ) first order stochastically dominates G(·|γ′)
whenever γ > γ′. A low γ therefore indicates a low actual cost c.
A specific version of our model is the independent case, where the distribution of the shock
is independent of γ. Formally,
G(c | γ) = Gˆ(c− γ), (1)
where Gˆ is the distribution function of the shock s. For expositional clarity, we focus on the
independent case whenever this does not affect results qualitatively. The independent case is
natural when the cost shock is independent of the agent’s average efficiency characteristics such
as expertise, experience, or internal organization. A specific example is an infrastructure project
and the uncertainty pertaining to soil conditions or ground water levels. The independent case
automatically satisfies the first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(·|γ)}γ.
After the contract has been signed and before production takes place, the agent can, at a
cost k > 0, perfectly observe s and therefore learn the actual cost c. While the value of k is
common knowledge, the principal cannot observe which information the agent receives. Hence,
from the principal’s perspective, there is adverse selection at the contracting as well as after the
7The additive specification is without loss of generality because the shock can always be defined as the
difference between true and expected costs. The assumption that the support of the shock, and thus of true
costs, is R is for convenience only and standard in the literature.
8Throughout we assume, for technical reasons, that all partial derivatives of h, G, and g exist and are
bounded.
6
information acquisition stage. We will consider both observable and unobservable information
acquisition. In the latter case, there is an additional moral hazard problem at the information
acquisition stage. Finally, we assume that at the contracting stage the principal makes a take–it
or leave–it offer. If the agent rejects, he gets a type–independent outside option of zero.
3 First–best
As a benchmark, we first consider a first–best world, in which information acquisition and all
available information is publicly observable. In a first best world, the two crucial questions
are for which cost estimates γ the agent should acquire additional information and when to
execute the public project. Hence, a first–best contract specifies, first, for each agent type γ a
probability αFB(γ) with which the agent acquires information. Second, it specifies a probability
qFB(γ, c) with which the project is executed by an agent who has acquired information and
whose true costs turn out to be c. Finally, the contract determines a probability q¯FB(γ) with
which an agent who has not acquired information executes the project.
The answer to the question when to execute the project is straightforward. Depending on
whether true or expected costs are above or below the valuation v, the production probabilities
in the first best are either zero or one. Formally,
qFB(γ, c) =


1 if v ≥ c
0 if v < c
, q¯FB(γ) =


1 if v ≥ γ
0 if v < γ
. (2)
With these efficient implementation decisions, we can determine the first–best information
acquisition levels and understand how, in a first best world, information is used.
Depending on the implementation decision in the absence of additional information, the
acquisition of information plays one of two roles. First, if the decision without information
acquisition is to implement the project, then the procurer commits a type I error if c turns out
to be larger than v. In this case, a loss v − c is realized. Information acquisition prevents this
error. Formally, the (gross) expected value of information to prevent type I errors is
JFBI (γ) ≡
∫ ∞
v
(c− v) dG(c | γ). (3)
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Second, if the decision without information acquisition is to cancel the project, then the
procurer makes a type II error if c turns out to be smaller than v. Information acquisition
prevents this error, and thus the (gross) expected value of information to prevent type II errors
is
JFBII (γ) ≡
∫ v
−∞
(v − c) dG(c | γ). (4)
According to the first–best implementation decision (2), the procurer optimally implements
the project without additional information whenever γ ≤ v. Hence, the first–best value of
information is
JFB(γ) ≡


JFBI (γ) if γ ∈ [0, v]
JFBII (γ) if γ ∈ (v, γ¯].
(5)
Because γ is an unbiased estimate of actual costs, JFB is continuous at γ = v.9 Moreover,
the first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(·|γ)}γ implies that J
FB is increasing in the
range γ ∈ [0, v] and decreasing in the range γ ∈ (v, γ¯]. Hence, JFB is single peaked with its
maximum at γ = v. Let kFB ≡ JFB(v) denote this maximum. Figure 1 illustrates the typical
shape of the curve JFB.
Information acquisition is efficient for all γ with JFB(γ) ≥ k. Because JFB attains a
maximum at γ = v, information acquisition is never efficient if k ≥ kFB. Whenever k < kFB,
single–peakedness of JFB implies that there exist exactly two cut–offs γFB1 < v < γ
FB
2 , which
satisfy
JFBI (γ
FB
1 ) = k, J
FB
II (γ
FB
2 ) = k. (6)
Thus information acquisition is efficient if γ ∈ [γFB1 , γ
FB
2 ]. The next proposition summarizes
these results, and Figure 1 illustrates.
Proposition 1 The first–best implementation probabilities are given by (2). Moreover, it holds:
(i) If k < kFB, the first–best information acquisition probabilities are
αFB(γ) =


1 if γ ∈ [γFB1 , γ
FB
2 ]
0 if γ 6∈ [γFB1 , γ
FB
2 ]
. (7)
(ii) If k ≥ kFB, the first–best information acquisition probability is αFB(γ) = 0 for all γ.
9Note:
∫∞
v
(c− v)dG(c | γ) =
∫ v
−∞
(v − c)dG(c | γ)⇔
∫∞
−∞
(c− v)dG(c | γ) = 0⇔ γ − v = 0.
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γJFBIJ
FB
II
kFB
v
k
γFB1 γ
FB
2
info acq. to prevent
type I errors
info acq. to prevent
type II errors
no info acq. no info acq.
Figure 1: First–best information acquisition
4 The principal’s problem
We now return to the original problem with asymmetric information and look for the contract
that maximizes the principal’s payoff. A contract specifies a transfer and the probability with
which the agent has to produce the good in period 2, which, in principle, can be made contingent
on arbitrary forms of communication between the parties. A crucial step to reduce the number
of possible contracts is to apply the revelation principle for multistage games (Myerson 1986),
which asserts that the optimal contract can be found in the class of direct, incentive compatible
mechanisms.
A direct mechanism has the following structure: First, it requires the agent to submit a
report γˆ ∈ Γ in period 1. Subsequently, the mechanism gives a contingent, possibly proba-
bilistic, recommendation to the agent whether or not to acquire information. Let α(γˆ) be the
probability with which the contract recommends information acquisition. For the case that
information acquisition is not recommended, the contract specifies the transfers t¯(γˆ) from the
principal to the agent and the probability of production q¯(γˆ). When information acquisition
is recommended, the agent is required to submit a second report cˆ ∈ R in period 2, result-
ing in transfers t(γˆ, cˆ) and the probability of production q(γˆ, cˆ). Thus, a direct contract is a
combination (α, t¯, q¯, t, q).
A direct contract is incentive compatible when it induces truthtelling and obedience. Truth-
telling means that, on the equilibrium path, the agent has an incentive to report his new
information truthfully. Obedience means that, on the equilibrium path, the contract must
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give the agent an incentive to follow the contract’s recommendation whether or not to acquire
information.
Formally, let ΓI = {γ ∈ Γ | α(γ) > 0} denote the set of agent types that acquire information
with a strictly positive probability. Then truthtelling in period 2 requires for all γ ∈ ΓI that
t(γ, c)− cq(γ, c) ≥ t(γ, cˆ)− cq(γ, cˆ) ∀c, cˆ ∈ R. (AS2)
To state the first period truthtelling constraints, let U(γ) denote the utility of agent type γ
if he reports truthfully and obeys the contract’s recommendation:
U(γ) ≡ α(γ)
[∫ ∞
−∞
t(γ, c)− cq(γ, c) dG(c | γ)− k
]
+ (1− α(γ))[t¯(γ)− γq¯(γ)]. (8)
Incentive compatibility means that the agent cannot attain a higher utility than U(γ) by
adopting an untruthful reporting and/or disobedient information acquisition strategy. Notice
that whatever the agent does in period 1, if he is required to submit a report in period 2,
the second period constraints (AS2) guarantee that he reports truthfully in period 2.10 Hence,
even though the revelation principle does not require it, our setup yields truthtelling also off
the equilibrium path.11 With this in mind, we now consider all the deviations which incentive
compatibility is meant to prevent and classify them in three different groups.
First, an agent type γ must not gain by reporting some type γˆ and, subsequently, obey the
contract’s information acquisition recommendation:
U(γ) ≥ α(γˆ)
[∫ ∞
−∞
t(γˆ, c)− cq(γˆ, c) dG(c | γ)− k
]
+(1−α(γˆ))[t¯(γˆ)−γq¯(γˆ)] ∀γ, γˆ ∈ Γ. (AS1)
Moreover, an agent type γ must not gain by reporting γˆ and then disobeying when the contract
requires him to acquire information:
U(γ) ≥ α(γˆ)[t(γˆ, γ)− γq(γˆ, γ)] + (1− α(γˆ))[t¯(γˆ)− γq¯(γˆ)] ∀γ, γˆ ∈ Γ. (MH)
Finally, an agent type must not gain by disobeying when the contract requires him not to
acquire information. However, this cannot be optimal for any agent type, because when no
10E.g., expected utility of a type γ, who is ignorant of his actual costs c and reports some costs cˆ, is t(γ, cˆ)−
q(γ, cˆ)
∫
cdG(c|γ) = t(γ, cˆ)− q(γ, cˆ)γ. According to (AS2) his payoff is maximized for a report cˆ = γ.
11This would be different if the support of final costs c depended on the first period information γ. See
Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2008) for a discussion of the case when the supports of final costs do not overlap.
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information acquisition is recommended, transfers and implementation probabilities do not
condition on the additional cost information c so that the value of information for the agent is
zero. Thus, the agent would only lose k.
The classification into truthtelling and obedience constraints allows us to distinguish be-
tween observable and unobservable information acquisition. If information acquisition is ob-
servable, the contract can enforce the agent’s obedience directly. In this case, we are left with
the truthtelling constraints (AS2) and (AS1) while the constraints (MH) are redundant. Con-
sequently, we refer to (AS2) as second period and to (AS1) as first period adverse selection
constraints. Because the obedience constraints (MH) only arise when information acquisition
is unobservable, we refer to them as moral hazard constraints.
To guarantee the agent’s participation in an incentive compatible contract, it needs to be
individually rational:
U(γ) ≥ 0 ∀γ ∈ Γ. (IR)
As is standard in the sequential screening literature, we require individual rationality from an
ex ante perspective only. We call an incentive compatible contract that is individually rational
feasible.
The principal’s payoff from a feasible contract is the difference between the total surplus
and the agent’s utility. That is, when the agent is of type γ, the principal’s payoff is
W (γ) ≡ α(γ)
[∫ ∞
−∞
[v − c]q(γ, c) dG(c | γ)− k
]
+ (1− α(γ))[v − γ]q¯(γ)− U(γ), (9)
and the principal’s objective is his expected payoff
W ≡
∫ γ¯
0
W (γ) dF (γ). (10)
The principal’s problem with unobservable information acquisition, referred to as P, can there-
fore be stated as follows:
P : max
(α,t¯,q¯,t,q)
W s.t. (AS2), (AS1), (MH), (IR). (11)
With observable information acquisition, the principal’s problem is a relaxed version of P,
referred to as R:
R : max
(α,t¯,q¯,t,q)
W s.t. (AS2), (AS1), (IR). (12)
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5 Observable Information Acquisition
We first solve the principal’s problem R where information acquisition is observable. Our
procedure is similar to the well–known approach for solving static screening problems without
additional ex post information.12 In static problems, when the agent’s cost function satisfies the
single–crossing property, then incentive compatibility is equivalent to a monotone allocation rule
and the fact that, up to the utility of the least efficient agent, the agent’s utility is determined
by the allocation alone. We begin by showing that this property carries over to the second
period adverse selection constraints.
Let uI(γ, c) ≡ t(γ, c)− cq(γ, c)− k denote the agent’s utility when he is informed. It then
follows:
Lemma 1 Let γ ∈ ΓI . Then there are transfers t(γ, c) such that (AS2) holds if and only if
q(γ, c) is non–increasing in c, (MON2)
∂uI(γ, c)/∂c = −q(γ, c) a.e. (13)
The proof of Lemma 1 is standard and therefore omitted. In static screening problems, the
characterization of incentive compatibility in terms of monotonicity and the agent’s utility
implies that in the principal’s problem, transfers can be eliminated both in the objective and
in the constraints. In contrast, the first period adverse selection constraints (AS1) cannot be
characterized in terms of monotonicity conditions of the allocation rule. The reason is that the
agent’s utility is given by an expectation over his cost function and so depends on the whole
schedule of allocations instead of a single, type specific allocation only. This leaves the single–
crossing property without bite. However, the next lemma demonstrates that (AS1) together
with (13) still imply that the agent’s utility is determined by the allocation alone. This will
later allow us to eliminate transfers in the principal’s objective but not in the constraints.
Lemma 2 Under (AS1) and (13), the derivative U ′(γ) exists for almost all γ ∈ Γ and whenever
it exists, it equals
U ′(γ) = α(γ)
∫ ∞
−∞
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
q(γ, c) dc− (1− α(γ))q¯(γ). (14)
12This approach is also adopted in Courty and Li (2000).
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Lemma 2 follows by a standard envelope argument. Since U(γ) = −
∫ γ¯
γ
U ′(z)dz + U(γ¯), the
agent’s utility is thus determined up to the least efficient agent’s utility U(γ¯) which leaves us
to determine U(γ¯). In a standard static problem, the single–crossing condition implies that
the utility of the least efficient type is pinned down by the individual rationality constraint.
Again, since in our context the agent’s utility is given by an expectation over a whole range of
allocations, the single–crossing property cannot be used to determine U(γ¯). Instead, we exploit
that {G(· | γ)}γ is ranked by first order stochastic dominance. It implies that ∂G(c | γ)/∂γ ≤ 0,
and so by Lemma 2, U ′(γ) ≤ 0. We therefore obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 Under (AS1) and (13), (IR) is equivalent to U(γ¯) ≥ 0.
Clearly, at the optimal contract it must hold that U(γ¯) = 0. This condition then takes
care of the individual rationality constraint and determines agent type γ’s utility by Lemma 2.
Hence, we can substitute out U(γ) in the objective W . By applying a common integration by
parts argument, we obtain the objective as a function of the implementation and the information
acquisition probabilities only.13 This allows us to re–state the problem R as follows:
R : max
(α,t¯,q¯,t,q)
∫ γ¯
0
{
α(γ)
(∫ ∞
−∞
[
v − c+
∂G(c | γ)/∂γ
g(c | γ)
h(γ)
]
q(γ, c) dG(c | γ)− k
)
(15)
+ (1− α(γ))[v − γ − h(γ)]q¯(γ)
}
dF (γ)
s.t. (AS1), (MON2).
We stress again that even though we have inserted the utility expression (14) derived from (AS1)
into the objective, this does not eliminate the constraint (AS1), because it is not equivalent to
a monotonicity condition of the allocation. This is different for the constraint (AS2) which is
equivalent to the constraints (MON2) and (13). Since we have inserted (13) into the objective,
we are left with (MON2).
Before we solve the principal’s problem, it is helpful to interpret the objective (15). We
can think of the principal as maximizing total surplus where, instead of true costs, he faces
higher virtual costs that arise because an information rent has to be conceded to the agent. If
information acquisition does not take place, the virtual costs are γ + h(γ). They are the same
13The details of the derivation are presented in the Appendix.
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as the virtual costs in the static screening problem in which additional information cannot
be acquired. As usual, the hazard rate h(γ) measures the extent of asymmetric information
between the agent and the principal about the expected costs γ. If information acquisition does
take place, the virtual costs are c− ψ(γ, c)h(γ) with
ψ(γ, c) ≡
∂G(c | γ)/∂γ
g(c | γ)
. (16)
They are the same as the virtual costs in a sequential screening problem in which each agent
type exogenously observes the cost shock. Baron and Besanko (1984) interpret ψ as an in-
formativeness measure which captures how the agent’s private knowledge about the true cost
distribution G changes across types. For the independent case, where the signal and the cost
shock are independent, we have ψ(γ, c) = −1 so that virtual costs are simply c + h(γ). This
means that the possibility that the agent receives additional information in period 2 does not
change the degree of asymmetric information in period 1. Because with observable information
acquisition our qualitative results do not depend on the shape of ψ, we will, for expositional
clarity, focus on the independent case. We return to the general case in Section 6, where we
show that the effect of unobservable information acquisition depends crucially on ψ. For this
reason, we nevertheless prove all our results for the general case.
We now turn to the solution of the principal’s problem R. In Subsection 5.1 we solve the
unconstrained version of problem R where we ignore the constraints (AS1) and (MON2). In
Subsection 5.2, we then check whether the solution actually satisfies these omitted constraints.
5.1 Solution to the unconstrained problem
The solution to the unconstrained version of problem R can be obtained by point–wise max-
imization for each γ in two steps. In the first step, the optimal implementation probabilities
are determined for fixed α(γ). Clearly, this step amounts to setting the allocation q(·) to zero
if the associated term in the squared brackets in (15) is strictly negative and setting it to one
otherwise. This procedure yields:
Lemma 4 For each γ there is a unique c0(γ) ≤ v and there is a unique γ0 ≤ v given by
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v = c0(γ) + h(γ), v = γ0 + h(γ0), (17)
14In the general case, c0(γ) is determined by v = c0(γ)− ψ(γ, c0(γ))h(γ).
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such that the optimal implementation probabilities in the solution to the unconstrained version
of problem R are given by
q∗(γ, c) =


1 if c ≤ c0(γ)
0 if c > c0(γ)
, q¯∗(γ) =


1 if γ ≤ γ0
0 if γ > γ0
. (18)
Lemma 4 reveals the typical distortions that are implied by the rent–efficiency trade–off that
the principal faces. Observe that the second best (expected) cost thresholds γ0 and c0(γ) are
both smaller than the first–best cost threshold v. Hence, the principal distorts the implemen-
tation probabilities downwards relative to the first–best. The downward distortion lowers the
information rent the principal needs to concede to the agent, because it reduces the extent to
which a relatively efficient type could gain by mimicking a relatively inefficient type.
The second step is to determine the optimal information acquisition probabilities. Similarly
to the first–best, the purpose of information acquisition is to prevent type I or type II imple-
mentation errors. Indeed, suppose that the principal implements the project in the absence of
further information. In this case her payoff is v − γ − h(γ). If information is available, the
project is implemented if costs are smaller than c0(γ) in which case the principal obtains the
payoff v − c+ ψ(γ, c)h(γ). Thus, the principal’s (gross) value of information is
J∗I (γ) ≡
∫ c0(γ)
−∞
v − c− h(γ) dG(c | γ)− [v − γ − h(γ)] (19)
=
∫ ∞
c0(γ)
(c+ h(γ)− v)dG(c | γ), (20)
where we have used that v − γ − h(γ) =
∫∞
−∞
v − c − h(γ)dG(c|γ). Expression (20) reveals
that, due to information rents, the principal’s value of information is distorted relative to the
first–best: From the principal’s perspective, a type I error occurs if virtual costs, c+ h(γ), are
larger than v, whereas from a first–best perspective, it occurs if true costs, c, are larger than v.
Note that the definition (17) implies that c0 is non–increasing in γ because h is non–increasing
in γ and c. Moreover, h is non–decreasing so that the first order stochastic dominance ranking
of {G(· | γ)}γ implies that J
∗
I (γ) is increasing.
Similarly, suppose that in the absence of information acquisition, the principal cancels the
project. In this case, information acquisition prevents a type II error whenever the value of the
project v exceeds the virtual costs c+ h(γ), and the principal’s (gross) value of information is
J∗II(γ) ≡
∫ c0(γ)
−∞
(v − c− h(γ))dG(c | γ). (21)
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Because h is non–decreasing and c0 is non–increasing, the first order stochastic dominance
ranking of {G(· | γ)}γ implies that J
∗
II(γ) is decreasing.
According to Lemma 4, the principal executes the project without additional information
exactly when γ ≤ γ0. Consequently, the principal’s (gross) value of information is
J∗(γ) ≡


J∗I (γ) if γ ∈ [0, γ0]
J∗II(γ) if γ ∈ (γ0, γ¯].
(22)
Notice that J∗ is continuous in γ = γ0.
15 Moreover, since J∗I is increasing and J
∗
II decreasing,
J∗(γ) is single–peaked with a maximum at γ0 of
k∗ ≡ J∗(γ0) =
∫ c0(γ0)
−∞
(v − c− h(γ0))dG(c | γ0).
Information acquisition by an agent type γ is optimal for the principal if and only if J∗(γ) ≥
k. Since J∗ is at most k∗, information acquisition is never optimal if k ≥ k∗. If k < k∗, then
single–peakedness of J∗ implies that there are exactly two cut–offs γ∗1 < γ0 < γ
∗
2 , which satisfy
J∗(γ∗1) = k, J
∗(γ∗2) = k. (23)
Thus, it is optimal to induce information acquisition if γ ∈ [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ]. The following lemma
summarizes these results.
Lemma 5 The optimal information acquisition probabilities in the solution to the uncon-
strained version of problem R are given as follows:
(i) If k < k∗, then
α∗(γ) =


1 if γ ∈ [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ]
0 if γ 6∈ [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ]
. (24)
(ii) If k ≥ k∗, then α∗(γ) = 0 for all γ.
5.2 Solution to the constrained problem
We now address the question whether our solution to the relaxed version of R actually satisfies
the constraints (AS1) and (MON2). In static problems, this simply amounts to checking a
15Recall that by definition of γ0: v − γ0 − h(γ0) = 0. Hence, by (19) and (21), J
∗
I (γ0) = J
∗
II(γ0).
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monotonicity condition, which in turn is guaranteed by a monotone hazard rate. Recall from
our earlier discussion that in a sequential screening problem, the first period adverse selec-
tion constraints (AS1), in general, cannot be characterized in terms of monotonicity. It turns
out, however, that what prevents such a characterization is that contracts are allowed to be
stochastic. In fact, our next result demonstrates that for deterministic contracts, (AS1) can be
characterized by a monotonicity condition.16 Since the solution to the unconstrained problem
is deterministic, this implies that it also solves the constrained problem.
We define a contract as deterministic when the decision to implement the project and the
information acquisition recommendation are deterministic: α, q¯, q ∈ {0, 1}. We say that a
deterministic allocation (α, q¯, q) is non–increasing if there are γ1, γ2 with γ1 ≤ γ2 and a non–
increasing cutoff cˆ0 : [γ1, γ2]→ R such that
α(γ) =


1 if γ ∈ [γ1, γ2]
0 if γ 6∈ [γ1, γ2]
, q¯(γ) =


1 if γ < γ1
0 if γ > γ2
, q(γ, c) =


1 if c ≤ cˆ0(γ)
0 if c > cˆ0(γ).
(25)
We call an allocation that satisfies (25) non–increasing because it implies the monotonic-
ity condition (MON2) and because the expected implementation probability α(γ)q¯(γ) + (1 −
α(γ))
∫∞
−∞
q(γ, c)dG(c|γ) is non–increasing in γ. The following lemma states our characteriza-
tion result for deterministic contracts.
Lemma 6 There are transfers (t¯, t) such that a deterministic contract (α, t¯, q¯, t, q) satisfies the
adverse selection constraints (AS1) and (MON2) if and only if (α, q¯, q) is non–increasing.
Because our solution to the relaxed version of R displays a deterministic, non–increasing
allocation, the lemma implies that transfers exist so that the corresponding contract satisfies
(AS1) and (MON2).
Proposition 2 There are transfers (t¯∗, t∗) such that the contract C∗ = (α∗, t¯∗, q¯∗, t∗, q∗) solves
problem R and is, therefore, optimal.
5.3 Option contracts
In this subsection, we show that the implied transfers of Lemma 6 allow a reinterpretation
of the contract as a menu that gives the agent the choice between a fixed price contract and
16To our knowledge, this characterization result is new to the sequential screening literature.
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various option contracts. Consequently, any deterministic, direct mechanism that satisfies the
adverse selection constraints can also be implemented by an indirect, empirically more natural
contract. This is true in particular of the optimal contract C∗.
To demonstrate this, we first show how the adverse selection constraints pin down transfers
in Lemma 6. Consider first the range of agent types who do not acquire information. Since
all types in (γ2, γ¯], do not execute the project, (AS1) implies that all these types have to get
the same transfer. If the individual rationality constraint is binding, this transfer is zero. On
the other hand, all types in [0, γ1) execute the project with certainty. Therefore, (AS1) implies
that transfers have to be the same for all types in [0, γ1), say t¯. Hence, the first period adverse
selection constraints (AS1) imply that the transfer schedule t¯(γ) exhibits
t¯(γ) =


t¯ if γ < γ1
0 if γ > γ2.
(26)
Next, consider an agent type γ who acquires information. The transfer t(γ, c) is now pinned
down by the second period adverse selection constraints (AS2). Indeed, the project is executed
if the cost realization c is smaller than the cutoff cˆ0(γ). Thus, (AS2) implies that all cost
types c ≤ cˆ0(γ) who exceute the project have to get the same transfer, say t0(γ). Similarly,
all cost types who abandon the project (c > cˆ0(γ)) have to get the same transfer, say t1(γ).
Moreover, the critical cost type cˆ0(γ) has to be indifferent between executing and abandoning
the project. Otherwise, some types close to cˆ0(γ) would have incentives to lie. This pins down
the difference between t0(γ) and t1(γ) so that t1(γ) = t0(γ) + cˆ0(γ). Hence, the second period
adverse selection constraints (AS2) imply that the transfer schedule t(γ, c) exhibits
t(γ, c) =


t0(γ) if c > cˆ0(γ)
t0(γ) + cˆ0(γ) if c ≤ cˆ0(γ).
(27)
Finally, the levels of t0 and t¯ are pinned down by the condition that the boundary type γ1
(resp. γ2) has to be indifferent between acquiring information and implementing (resp. not
implementing) the project without acquiring information. If this was not the case, there would
be types close to γ1 (resp. γ2) with an incentive to misreport. Observe that in pinning down
transfers, we employed the local adverse selection constraints only, that is, that no type mimics a
type close by. The proof of Lemma 6 shows that with a deterministic, non–increasing allocation
these transfers actually satisfy the adverse selection constraints globally.
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The shape of transfers allows the principal to implement the direct contract indirectly
through a menu of contracts that consists of a fixed price contract and a range of option
contracts. To see this, consider first what happens if the agent announces a type who does
not acquire information. Announcing γ > γ2 simply amounts to rejecting the contract, as it
entails not executing the project and zero transfers. Announcing γ < γ1 amounts to picking a
fixed price contract which obliges the agent to complete the project at all cost circumstances
for the price t¯. Next, consider what happens if the agent announces a type who does acquire
information. After his first report γ, the agent subsequently faces a choice between announcing
a type c > cˆ0(γˆ) or a type c ≤ cˆ0(γˆ). In the first case, the project is canceled and the agent
receives t0(γˆ), while in the second case the project is implemented and the agent receives
t0(γˆ) + cˆ0(γˆ). Hence, effectively the agent receives the transfer t0(γˆ) upfront and then has two
options: walk away or complete the project for the price cˆ0(γˆ).
It consequently follows that the outcome of the optimal direct mechanism C∗ is also im-
plemented by the indirect menu contract C ′ ≡ {(α = 0, t¯∗), (α = 1, c0(γ), t
∗
0(γ))γ∈[γ∗1 ,γ∗2 ]}.
The menu consists of the fixed price contract (α = 0, t¯∗) and a range of option contracts
(α = 1, c0(γ), t
∗
0(γ))γ. We summarize this discussion in the next proposition for the non–trivial
case k < k∗.17
Proposition 3 If k < k∗, then the outcome under the optimal contract C∗ also obtains with
the contract C ′ = {(α∗ = 0, t¯∗), (α∗ = 1, c0(γ), t
∗
0(γ))γ∈[γ∗1 ,γ∗2 ]}.
5.4 Distortions in information acquisition
We next investigate the distortions in information acquisition. Recall that the principal, instead
of maximizing overall surplus, is only interested in the share of the surplus that she can extract.
Due to asymmetric information, the principal must leave a part of the surplus — the information
rents — to the agent, and consequently she is also interested in how the amount of information
acquisition affects the size of these rents. We now show that this information rent effect is
intimately linked to the type of errors that information acquisition is meant to prevent. This
allows us to identify the unambiguous direction of the distortions and develop a straightforward
intuition for them.
17For k ≥ k∗, no information acquisition takes place, and the optimal contract is simply a fixed price contract.
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First, suppose that information acquisition is used to prevent type I errors. In this case,
the social value of information is JFBI (γ) while the value to the principal is J
∗
I (γ). Because
h(γ) ≥ 0 and c0(γ) = v − h(γ) < v, it follows
JFBI (γ) =
∫ ∞
v
(c− v)dG(c | γ) (28)
≤
∫ ∞
v
(c− v + h(γ))dG(c | γ) ≤
∫ ∞
c0(γ)
(c− v + h(γ))dG(c | γ) (29)
= J∗I (γ). (30)
The inequality shows that the principal overvalues information acquisition relative to the first
best. That is, for preventing type I errors there is a positive information rent effect which
increases the principal’s value above the first best value of information.
The intuition is as follows. When additional information prevents type I errors, some
projects are turned down that would otherwise have been implemented. This means that,
from an ex ante perspective, information acquisition reduces the implementation probability
q. A reduction in q for some cost type implies that, from a period 1 perspective, it becomes
less worthwhile for a more efficient cost type to mimic this cost type. Hence, the principal
has to pay lower information rents to the more efficient cost types when inducing information
acquisition. As a result, the optimal contract displays excess information acquisition to prevent
type I errors: γ∗ ≤ γFB1 .
Next, suppose information acquisition is used to prevent type II errors. In this case, the
social value of information is JFBII (γ) and the value to the principal is J
∗
II(γ). Because of
h(γ) ≥ 0 and c0(γ) = v − h(γ) < v, it now follows
JFBII (γ) =
∫ v
−∞
(v − c)dG(c | γ) (31)
≥
∫ v
−∞
(v − c− h(γ))dG(c | γ) ≥
∫ c0(γ)
−∞
(v − c− h(γ))dG(c | γ) (32)
= J∗II(γ). (33)
The inequality shows that the principal undervalues information acquisition relative to the first
best. That is, for preventing type II errors there is a negative information rent effect which
decreases the principal’s value below the first best value of information.
Although the sign of the information rent effect is now negative, the intuition behind the
result follows from the same logic. When additional information prevents type II errors, some
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Figure 2: Distortions in information acquisition
projects are implemented that would otherwise have been canceled. Hence, from an ex ante
perspective, information acquisition increases the implementation probability q, and so the
principal has to pay higher information rents to the more efficient cost types when inducing
information acquisition. As a result, the optimal contract displays too little information ac-
quisition to prevent type II errors: γ∗2 ≤ γ
FB
2 . We summarize this key result in Proposition
4.
Proposition 4 Under the optimal contract, information acquisition is distorted so that there
is excess (resp. insufficient) information acquisition to prevent types I (resp. type II) errors:
γ∗1 ≤ γ
FB
1 and γ
∗
2 ≤ γ
FB
2 .
Figure 2 illustrates the distortions. The curve J∗I lies higher than the curve J
FB
I , whereas
the curve J∗II lies below the curve J
FB
II . This implies that for a given k, the set of types who
acquire information the second–best, [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ] lies to the left of the set of types who acquire
information in the first–best, [γFB1 , γ
FB
2 ]. It further shows how the two sets shrink as k rises.
As of k¯ the sets [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ] and [γ
FB
1 , γ
FB
2 ] are disjoint: none of the types who acquire information
in the second best acquire information in the first best. This demonstrates that distortions
may lead to qualitatively different outcomes.
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6 Unobservable information acquisition
In this section, we examine the case when information acquisition is unobservable, and thus the
optimal contract must also satisfy the moral hazard constraints (MH). The two key questions
are whether the moral hazard problem causes the principal additional agency costs and how
this affects distortions. We proceed in two steps. We first characterize when the optimal
contract with observable information acquisition automatically satisfies (MH). Whenever this
is the case, we say that the moral hazard problem does not cause additional agency costs. In
the second step, we discuss how the optimal contract changes when the moral hazard problem
causes additional agency costs and affects distortions.
Because subsequent results depend crucially on the conditional cost distributions G(c|γ),
there is a loss in restricting attention to the independent case. For this reason, we now consider
more general distributions G for which the informativeness measure ψ(γ, c) is no longer con-
stant. In order to extend Lemma 4 to more general distributions, we impose the regularity con-
ditions that ∂ψ/∂c ·h < 1 and that ψ is non–increasing in γ. The proof of Lemma 4 shows that
the first condition guarantees a unique cost type c0(γ) that solves v−c0(γ)+ψ(γ, c0(γ))h(γ) = 0.
The second condition then implies that c0(γ) is non–increasing in γ.
18 Since {G(c|γ)}γ is ranked
by first order stochastic dominance, ψ(γ, c) is negative. Finally, we require that for all γ ∈ Γ:
∫ ∞
−∞
ψ(γ, c) dG(c | γ) = −1. (34)
This is only a mild, technical condition. It is satisfied for any family of distribution functions
with bounded support and, therefore, is a natural continuity requirement.19 It guarantees that,
similar to (22), the value of information J∗ is the respective integral over the virtual surplus.
6.1 Agency costs through moral hazard
We turn to the question when the optimal contract with observable information acquisition,
C ′, automatically satisfies the moral hazard constraints (MH). In what follows we refer to C ′
18Differentiating the identity with respect to γ yields: c′
0
(1− ∂ψ/∂c · h) = ∂ψ/∂γ · h+ ψ · h′. Hence, c′
0
≤ 0.
19For this reason, a sufficient condition for (34) is that G(c|γ) converges fast enough to 1 as c → +∞ and
fast enough to 0 as c→ −∞. It then follows by integration by part:
∫∞
−∞
ψ(γ, c) dG(c|γ) = ∂
∂γ
∫∞
−∞
G(c γ)dc =
∂
∂γ
[cG(c|γ)]∞−∞ −
∂
∂γ
∫∞
−∞
c dG(c | γ) = −1.
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as the benchmark contract. For the non–trivial case k < k∗, we provide two conditions for
the benchmark contract to satisfy (MH), one in terms of transfers and one in terms of the
informativeness measure ψ.
We first establish two straightforward necessary conditions on the cutoff c0(γ) and transfers
t¯∗ and t∗0(γ) so that the moral hazard problem does not cause additional agency costs. The
first condition is that t∗0(γ) ≤ 0 for all γ ∈ [γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 ]. The condition is necessary, because if t
∗
0(γ)
were strictly positive for some γ, then a type γ′ ≥ γ∗2 , instead of rejecting the contract and
receiving zero, would have a strict incentive to announce type γ in order to receive the upfront
transfer t∗0(γ) > 0 and, subsequently, quit the project without acquiring information. The
second condition is that the net transfer when executing the project must not be higher than
the transfer under the fixed price contract, that is, t¯∗ ≥ c0(γ) + t
∗
0(γ) for all γ ∈ [γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 ]. The
condition is necessary, because if t¯∗ were smaller than c0(γ)+ t
∗
0(γ) for some γ, then a relatively
efficient type γ′ < γ∗1 would have a strict incentive to report type γ rather than his true type
γ′ and then, without acquiring information, choose the option to implement the project. This
strategy would allow him to complete the project for an overall transfer c0(γ) + t
∗
0(γ) instead
of the lower transfer t¯∗.
We now argue that these two conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient for the
moral hazard problem to not cause additional agency costs. To show sufficiency, it remains to
be checked that an agent type, γ ∈ [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ], who is supposed to acquire information actually
does so. There are two deviations to consider. First, suppose that such an agent type picks
an option contract but deviates by quitting the project without acquiring information. The
deviator ends up with the non–positive transfer t∗0(γ) and rejecting the contract would be a
weakly better deviation. But since C ′ is individually rational, rejecting the contract cannot
be profitable. Second, suppose that an agent type γ ∈ [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ] picks an option contract but
deviates by completing the project without acquiring information. If this deviation is profitable,
then, due to t¯∗ ≥ c0(γ) + t
∗
0(γ), an even more profitable deviation is to pick the fixed price
contract. But because the benchmark contract satisfies the adverse selection constraints (AS1),
this second deviation is also not profitable. Thus, we have established:
Lemma 7 The moral hazard problem does not cause additional agency costs if and only if for
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all γ ∈ [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ]:
t¯∗ ≥ c0(γ) + t
∗
0(γ) and t
∗
0(γ) ≤ 0. (35)
While intuitive, the previous condition has the drawback that it depends on transfers which
are endogenous. In the next lemma, we, therefore, give a sufficient condition that is only based
on the primitive ψ.
Lemma 8 If ∂ψ/∂c < 0, then the moral hazard problem causes additional agency costs. If
∂ψ/∂c ≥ 0, then the moral hazard problem does not cause additional agency costs. In particular,
the moral hazard problem does not cause additional agency costs in the independent case.
Lemma 8 shows that the sign of the partial derivative ∂ψ/∂c determines whether or not the
moral hazard problem causes additional agency costs. We shall explain the intuition behind
this result in detail, as it will guide us in constructing the optimal contract when the moral
hazard problem causes additional agency costs.
Intuitively, the agent has an incentive to acquire information when his value of information
exceeds acquisition costs k. Note that when the agent chooses an option contract, information
is valuable to the agent, because the contract allows him to choose the best option according
to true cost conditions. Hence, the crucial question is to what extent the agent’s value of
information coincides with the principal’s. To answer this, consider the value of information to
some agent type γ. Given an option contract, type γ’s next best alternative without information
is either to execute the project for a price p = c0(γ) or to quit the project. Under the first
alternative, an informed type γ saves p − c when the additional information reveals that the
cost c exceeds p. Therefore, the agent’s value of information in this case is
JAI (p, γ) =
∫ ∞
p
c− p dG(c | γ), (36)
where, under the benchmark contract, p equals c0(γ). When the next best alternative is to quit
the project, an informed type γ gains p − c when the additional information reveals that the
cost c is smaller than the price p. Hence, the agent’s value of information in this case is
JAII(p, γ) =
∫ p
−∞
p− c dG(c | γ). (37)
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Now, the moral hazard problem does not cause additional agency costs when the agent’s
value of information is sufficiently large. More precisely, suppose that the agent type γ’s value
of information is larger than k whenever the principal’s value of information J∗(γ) is also
larger than k. In that case, the agent’s and the principal’s incentives to acquire information
are aligned, and the agent voluntarily acquires information. Hence, if JAI (c0(γ), γ) ≥ k and
JAII(c0(γ), γ) ≥ k for all γ ∈ [γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 ], then there are no additional agency costs.
In order to see that the sign of ∂ψ/∂c determines whether this is the case, consider a
situation where both the principal’s and the agent’s best alternative without information is to
abandon the project. In that case, the principal’s value of information is her virtual valuation
integrated over the cost range c < c0(γ) while the agent’s value of information is his “gross ex
post rent” c0(γ)− c integrated over the same range. Now observe that both the virtual surplus
and the gross ex post rent are exactly zero at c0(γ), and in the range c < c0(γ) the ex post
gross rent increases at a rate of +1 as c becomes smaller, while the principal’s virtual surplus
increases at the rate of 1− ∂ψ/∂c · h. Hence, for the independent case ∂ψ/∂c = 0, these rates
coincide and therefore also the agent’s and the principal’s value of information. For ∂ψ/∂c > 0,
the agent’s value of information is actually larger than the principal’s so that the agent has a
strict incentive to acquire information whenever the principal wants him to do so. If, on the
other hand, ∂ψ/∂c < 0, then the principal’s value of information is larger than the agent’s.
In that case, incentives for information acquisition are misaligned for some types γ, and the
benchmark contract has to be adapted to account for the moral hazard problem. We now turn
to this issue.
6.2 Optimal contract when moral hazard causes agency costs
Finding the optimal contract when the moral hazard problem causes additional agency costs
is complicated in general because the adverse selection constraint cannot be characterized in
terms of monotonicity. However, as shown in Lemma 6, for deterministic contracts such a
characterization is possible. This will allow us to solve the problem when we restrict attention
to deterministic contracts. In light of Lemma 6, we can associate with any deterministic contract
that satisfies the adverse selection constraints a non–increasing cutoff cˆ0 : [γ1, γ2] → R. Recall
from section 5.3 that any such contract can be implemented by a menu of option contracts
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where the option price to execute the project coincides with the cutoff cˆ0(γ). In what follows,
we therefore use the terms price and cutoff interchangeably.
With deterministic contracts there are, in effect, two ways how to modify the benchmark
contract when it violates the moral hazard constraints. First, the principal could limit infor-
mation acquisition to those agent types whose value of information is already high enough. In
this case, additional agency costs arise since information acquisition sometimes does not take
place even though the principal’s value of information exceeds k. The other possibility is to
adapt the price p = c0(γ) so as to raise the agent’s value of information. Due to incentive
compatibility, a price increase (resp. decrease) means, however, that the agent executes (resp.
abandons) projects with a negative (resp. positive) virtual surplus. Hence, additional agency
costs also arise from this second possibility. The intuitive idea for finding the optimal contract
is to adapt the information acquisition interval and the price so that the two different types of
agency costs are optimally balanced.
We now formalize this idea. We first characterize all prices that give agents a positive
incentive to acquire information and look for the optimal price in this set. Given these optimal
prices, we can then determine the optimal range of information acquisition [γ1, γ2]. We begin by
showing that prices that induce information acquisition by the agent lie between two bounds,
pI and pII . Recall from (36) and (37) that confronted with a price p, the agent acquires
information if both JAI (p, γ) and J
A
II(p, γ) are larger than k; otherwise he would be better off
by taking the next best alternative without information. We have:
Lemma 9 Let i = I, II.
(i) For each γ, there is a unique solution pi(γ) to J
A
i (p, γ) = k.
(ii) pi is increasing in γ.
(iii) JAI (p, γ) ≥ k if and only if p ≤ pI(γ), and J
A
II(p, γ) ≥ k if and only if p ≥ pII(γ).
Lemma 9 implies that the set of prices for which the agent has a positive incentive to acquire
information is the band between the two pi–curves:
P ≡ {(γ, p) | pII(γ) ≤ p ≤ pI(γ)}. (38)
We can now provide a characterization analogous to Lemma 6 which includes the moral
hazard constraints. The additional requirement is that the endpoints of cˆ0 are in P .
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Lemma 10 There are transfers (t¯, t) such that a deterministic contract (α, t¯, q¯, t, q) satisfies
the adverse selection constraints (AS2), (AS1) and the moral hazard constraints (MH) if and
only if (α, q¯, q) is non–increasing and
(γ1, cˆ0(γ1)), (γ2, cˆ0(γ2)) ∈ P. (39)
As explained earlier, the moral hazard constraints are satisfied if the whole schedule cˆ0 is
in P . The reason why we only have to consider the endpoints is that the two pi-curves are
increasing, whereas cˆ0 is necessarily non–increasing.
Restricting attention to deterministic contracts, we can now treat problem P as usual.
By Lemma 1 and 2, the agent’s utility U is given by (14) and, therefore, decreasing in γ.
Optimality then requires that the individual rationality constraint is binding for the highest
type γ¯. Together with (14), this pins down the agent’s utility, which we can then insert in
the principal’s objective. Integration by parts transforms the principal’s objective into the
expected virtual surplus as stated in (15). Finally, by Lemma 10 and exploiting the structure
of a non–increasing allocation (α, q¯, q) we can restate the problem P as follows.
S : max
γ1,γ2,cˆ0
∫ γ1
0
v − γ − h(γ)dF (γ) +
∫ γ2
γ1
[
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
v − c+ ψ(c, γ)h(γ) dG(c | γ)− k]dF (γ)(40)
s.t. (39) and cˆ0 : [γ1, γ2]→ R is non–increasing.
We can find a solution to S by the following two–step procedure: First, determine the opti-
mal price schedule cˆ0 for given thresholds γ1 ≤ γ2 and, subsequently, determine the optimal
thresholds γ1 and γ2 by optimizing over all optimal price schedules cˆ0. We call cˆ0 optimal with
respect to a pair (γ1, γ2) if cˆ0 is a solution of S for given thresholds γ1 and γ2. The next lemma
characterizes the optimal price schedule cˆ0 given a pair (γ1, γ2).
Lemma 11 The price schedule c˜0 is optimal with respect to a pair (γ1, γ2) where
c˜0(γ) ≡ min{pI(γ1),max{c0(γ), pII(γ2)}}. (41)
Intuitively, the optimal schedule c˜0 coincides with the benchmark schedule c0 whenever
the price c0(γ) automatically induces type γ to acquire information, i.e., whenever c0(γ) lies
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Figure 3: Bunching due to moral hazard
in between pI(γ1) and pII(γ2). Otherwise, the price has to be adapted so as to increase the
agent’s value of information. Adapting the price implies a suboptimal decision by the agent in
period 2 and entails losses in virtual surplus. Hence, the optimal new price is the one closest
to the original price c0(γ) among all prices that are incentive compatible, i.e. non–increasing
and in P . As illustrated in Figure 3, the optimal schedule c˜0 can, therefore, be found by a
bunching or ironing procedure, which flattens parts of the benchmark schedule c0, leading to
price bunching for different γ types. The remaining problem is, then, to determine over which
ranges bunching takes place. The solution to this problem yields the optimal thresholds γ1 and
γ2. While the exact optimal thresholds γ1 and γ2 depend on the details of the primitives, the
following proposition shows how the moral hazard problem affects information acquisition:
Proposition 5 When the moral hazard problem causes agency costs, the range of information
acquisition shrinks relative to the case with observable information acquisition:
γ1 ≥ γ
∗
1 and γ2 ≤ γ
∗
2 . (42)
The intuition for Proposition 5 is that outside the interval [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ], information acquisition
costs k exceed, by definition, the principal’s value of information. Hence, even if a price could
be found that induces information acquisition by agent types outside of [γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 ], this would be
suboptimal because information acquisition would cause a loss to the principal.
Proposition 5 allows us to identify the impact of the moral hazard problem on the distortions
in information acquisition beyond those caused by adverse selection. When the moral hazard
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problem causes agency costs, then, relative to the case with observable information acquisition,
both more type I and more type II errors are committed. Hence, information acquisition to
prevent type I errors become less distorted and more efficient, while information acquisition
to prevent type II errors becomes more distorted and less efficient. Consequently, the welfare
effects of the additional moral hazard constraints are ambiguous and it could be that the first
effect outweighs the second. In this case, the presence of the moral hazard problem would
actually increase overall efficiency. Because the moral hazard problem unambiguously raises
the agency costs of the principal, an increase in efficiency means that the agent gains more
than the principal loses.
7 Empirical Implications
In this section, we relate our theoretical analysis to some features of real world contracts
and discuss testable implications of our theory. Earlier work on dynamic mechanism design
already demonstrated that option contracts represent optimal contractual structures in dynamic
screening problems. Classical examples of contracts with option clauses that adapt contracting
terms to new information are labor contracts, securities such as put or call options, or ticket
pricing. The existence of such contracts can be rationalized by straightforward reinterpretations
of our model (e.g. viewing the agent as the buyer with uncertain demand and the principal as
the seller). Option contracts are prevalent also in business-to-business procurement. Refund or
buy–back contracts play a key role in vertical manufacturer retailer relations in which there is
uncertainty (about demand or costs) during a sales period. The management literature reports
the widespread use of option contracts in publishing, CD retailing (Kandel, 1996), for fashion
goods such as apparel (Eppen and Iyer, 1997), in the semiconductor and consumer electronic
industries (Milner and Rosenblatt, 2002), or in catalogue retailing (Donohue, 2000). In all these
examples, private information and active information acquisition are often intertwined. Our
results show that the prevalence of option contracts in real life can be understood as optimal
contractual responses to both information acquisition and dynamic screening. Moreover, they
demonstrate the robustness of the previous literature that mainly concentrated on the screening
aspect.
In the introduction we motivated our analysis with the project management literature, which
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warns against “disastrous results” from delegating “the pre-project planning process entirely
to contractors”. Concentrating on the adverse selection and the moral hazard problems in
pre–project planning, our results help to shed light on the right mix of delegation and control.
At first glance, the detrimental practical experience with delegation seems at odds with the
optimality of option contracts which do delegate the decision whether or not to implement the
project to the agent. However, this does not mean that under an option contract the agent’s
remuneration is independent of the final outcome. Thus, our analysis suggests that delegation
of the decision right is not problematic per se, but should be supported with the right set of
incentives. In addition, the principal does not always need to control explicitly the agent’s
information acquisition even when information acquisition is observable. When the correla-
tion between the initial private information and the additional information is weak, then, by
Lemma 8, option contracts automatically provide the right incentives for information acquisi-
tion, and an explicit information acquisition clause is superfluous. When writing contracts is
costly, our analysis, therefore, predicts that optimal contracts will be more specific about infor-
mation acquisition in environments where initial and additional information are more strongly
correlated.
We, next, discuss how we may test the empirical significance of our narrower, more spe-
cific results. These predict how incentive problems relate to information acquisition: Adverse
selection problems reduce the amount of type I errors, whereas they increase the amount of
type II errors. In contrast, our theory predicts that the effect of adverse selection problems
on the overall amount of information acquisition is ambiguous. The moral hazard problem, on
the other hand, reduces the total amount of information acquisition and the more so when the
contractor’s additional information is correlated with the ex ante information.
To test these specific results empirically we, first of all, need data that allows us to distinguish
procurement settings according to their degree of adverse selection and moral hazard. Clearly,
this is not a problem that is specific for testing our contracting model. Indeed, one of the
key problems of the empirical contract theory literature is to find good proxies for the degree
of asymmetric information, because any contracting problem is due to some asymmetry of
information – be it adverse selection or moral hazard. By now there exists an extensive literature
on different approaches to measure the degree of asymmetric information that can also be
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applied to our framework. For instance, Chiappori and Salanie (2003) explain how an empirical
procedure of Wolak (1994) to identify adverse selection can be applied to procurement models
in general. Alternative proxies for the adverse selection problem are data on the experience
of the procurer with similar projects, the expertise necessary to conduct the project, or the
independence of the procurer from the contractor. A proxy for the moral hazard problem is the
degree of vertical integration of the contractor. If the contractor has to outsource information
acquisition himself, information acquisition is partially verifiable through e.g. purchase orders.
Of course, the use of qualitative measures might not be unproblematic due to endogeneity
issues.
In addition to the general problem of identifying the degree of asymmetric information, an
empirical testing of our results also requires more model specific data and, in particular, data
on the amount of information acquisition and type I and type II errors. Because direct evidence
on the amount of information acquisition is unlikely to be available, this information has to be
inferred indirectly. We may identify the amount of information acquisition from data on the
project’s initial cost estimate and its actual costs after the project’s completion. Because more
information acquisition leads to more accurate cost estimates, the difference between these
two values is a proxy for the amount of information acquisition. An alternative proxy for the
amount of information is the time elapsed between initiating and implementing the project,
because the acquisition of information and its evaluation, typically, takes time.
Moreover, we may identify the occurrence of a type I error with the project’s final cost and
the project’s (estimated) social value. If the final costs exceed the project’s value, then this
indicates, first of all, that not enough information acquisition took place and, second, that a
type I error was committed. On the other hand, the identification of type II errors cannot be
done on the basis of actual procurement data, because they are counterfactual. In order to
identify a type II error, one must compare the project’s actual cost of non–executed project
with the project’s social value. Yet, the actual cost realization of a non–executed project is a
counterfactual.20 Consequently, our narrower theoretical results offers two testable hypotheses.
First, the differences between estimated and actual project’s costs is larger in environments
where moral hazard problems are more likely. Second, final costs tend to exceed the project’s
20This observation may also explain the overwhelming anecdotal evidence that more projects incur cost
overruns than cost underruns.
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value less often when adverse selection problems are more likely.
8 Conclusions
We study how a principal optimally deals with the incentive problems in project management
when, due to large cost uncertainties, procurement projects require pre–project planning. These
incentive problems typically involve both adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the
procurement problem, we extend the standard sequential screening model to endogenous infor-
mation acquisition with moral hazard. The subsequent analysis offers a number of insights. In
particular, we identify systematic distortions on the amount of information acquisition under
the optimal contract and disentangle the distinct impact of adverse selection and moral hazard
on these distortions. This allows us to generate systematic, testable predictions. Moreover, we
show how a bunching procedure can be employed to account for moral hazard. In doing so we
present a new characterization of incentive compatibility for deterministic contracts in dynamic
screening models.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2 Let
U˜(γˆ; γ) ≡ α(γˆ)
∫ ∞
−∞
uI(γˆ, c) dG(c | γ) + (1− α(γˆ))[t¯(γˆ)− γq¯(γˆ)] (43)
be the agent type γ’s utility when he reports γˆ in period 1. Note that U˜(γˆ; γ) is decreasing
in γ. This follows from two observations: first −γq¯(γˆ) is decreasing in γ. Second, the integral
is decreasing in γ because of the first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(c | γ)}γ and
since uI(γˆ, c) is non–increasing in c by (13). Moreover, we have
U(γ) = max
γˆ∈Γ
U˜(γˆ, γ). (44)
As the maximum over decreasing functions, U is decreasing and thus differentiable almost
everywhere. We now compute the derivative for all γ at which it exists. Let δ > 0. Incentive
compatibility (AS1) implies
1/δ · [U(γ + δ)− U(γ)] ≥ 1/δ · [U˜(γ, γ + δ)− U˜(γ, γ)], (45)
1/δ · [U(γ)− U(γ − δ)] ≤ 1/δ · [U˜(γ, γ)− U˜(γ, γ − δ)]. (46)
As δ → 0, the right hand sides of the two previous inequalities converge to
α(γ)
∫ ∞
−∞
uI(γ, c)
∂g(c | γ)
∂γ
dc− (1− α(γ))q¯(γ). (47)
Therefore U ′(γ) equals (47). We conclude the proof by re–writing (47). By integration by
parts, and since ∂uI/∂c = −q by Lemma 1, we can write the integral as
uI(γ, c)
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
∞
−∞
+
∫ ∞
−∞
q(γ, c)
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
dc. (48)
Now note that limc→−∞G(c | γ) = 0 for all γ so that limc→−∞ ∂G(c | γ)/∂γ = 0. Similarly,
limc→+∞ ∂G(c | γ)/∂γ = 0. Thus, the first term in the previous expression vanishes, and we
arrive at
U ′(γ) = α(γ)
∫ ∞
−∞
q(γ, c)
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
dc− (1− α(γ))q¯(γ), (49)
which is the expression stated in Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
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Derivation of the objective in (15) Integration by parts delivers
∫ γ¯
0
U(γ) dF (γ) = U(γ)F (γ)|γ¯0 −
∫ γ¯
0
U ′(γ)
F (γ)
f(γ)
dF (γ) (50)
= −
∫ γ¯
0
U ′(γ)h(γ) dF (γ), (51)
where we have used that U(γ)F (γ)|γ¯0 = U(γ¯) = 0. Inserting this in the objective (10) yields
that
W =
∫ γ¯
0
α(γ)[
∫ ∞
−∞
[v − c]q(γ, c) dG(c | γ)− k] + (1− α(γ))[v − γ]q¯(γ) + U ′(γ)h(γ) dF (γ).(52)
If we now use the expression for U ′ stated in Lemma 2, we obtain the objective in (15). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 For later reference, we prove the result for the more general case, where
i) ∂ψ/∂c · h < 1, ii) ∂ψ/∂γ ≤ 0, and iii) ψ(γ, c) < 0. From i) it follows that c− ψ(γ, c)h(γ) is
strictly increasing in c so that there is a unique solution c0(γ) to v − c + ψ(γ, c)h(γ) = 0, and
v − c + ψ(γ, c)h(γ) > 0 if and only if c < c0(γ). From iii), we have that c0(γ) ≤ v. Similarly,
since h(γ) is non–decreasing by assumption, there is a unique solution γ0 to v − γ − h(γ) = 0,
and v − γ − h(γ) > 0 if and only if γ < γ0. Clearly, γ0 ≤ v. For the independent case, where
ψ(γ, c) = −1, condition (17) follows. In light of the objective (15), this implies that q∗ and q¯∗
are optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6 “⇒”: Since the contract is deterministic, the second period adverse
selection constraints (AS2) imply that q(γ, c) is given by a cut–off rule cˆ0(γ), where the project
is implemented if and only if costs c are smaller than the cut–off. Moreover, this implies that
the transfers when information is acquired are piece–wise constant: t(γ, c) = t0(γ) if c > cˆ0(γ)
and t(γ, c) = t1(γ) if c ≤ cˆ0(γ), where the cut–off type himself has to be indifferent between
implementing and quitting the project: t1(γ) = cˆ0(γ) + t0(γ).
We now show that the allocation is non–increasing. The argument is by contradiction.
Suppose first that cˆ0 is not non–increasing. Then there are γ, δ > 0 with γ, γ+ δ ∈ [γ1, γ2] and
cˆ0(γ) < cˆ0(γ + δ). Given the transfers t1 = t0 + cˆ0 and t0, and the deterministic allocation rule
the utility of agent type γ is
U(γ) =
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
(t1(γ)− c)dG(c | γ) +
∫ ∞
cˆ0(γ)
t0(γ)dG(c | γ)− k (53)
= t0(γ) +
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)dG(c | γ)− k. (54)
34
The first period adverse selection constraints (AS1) imply:
U(γ) ≥ t0(γ + δ) +
∫ cˆ0(γ+δ)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ + δ)− c)dG(c | γ)− k, (55)
U(γ + δ) ≥ t0(γ) +
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)dG(c | γ + δ)− k. (56)
Adding the two inequalities and re–arranging terms yields:∫ ∞
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)1(−∞,cˆ0(γ))(c)− (cˆ0(γ + δ)− c)1(−∞,cˆ0(γ+δ))(c) dG(c | γ) (57)
≥
∫ ∞
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)1(−∞,cˆ0(γ))(c)− (cˆ0(γ + δ)− c)1(−∞,cˆ0(γ+δ))(c) dG(c | γ + δ), (58)
where 1(a,b)(c) is an indicator function that is 1 if c ∈ (a, b) and 0 otherwise. Notice that
the integrand under the two integrals is the same. Since cˆ0(γ) < cˆ0(γ + δ) by assumption, the
integrand is increasing and strictly so in the range of (cˆ0(γ), cˆ0(γ+δ)). Hence, since G(c | γ+δ)
first order stochastically dominates G(c | γ), the second integral is strictly smaller than the
first one, a contradiction. Thus, we have shown that cˆ0 is non–increasing, as desired.
Next, we show that if there are γ, γ′ with γ < γ′ and α(γ) = 1, α(γ′) = 0, then we must
have that q¯(γ′) = 0. Indeed, suppose this is not true. Then for δ = γ′−γ > 0 we have α(γ) = 1
and α(γ + δ) = 0, but, since q¯ is deterministic, q¯(γ + δ) = 1. (AS1) implies that
t0(γ) +
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)dG(c | γ)− k ≥ t¯(γ + δ)− γ, (59)
t¯(γ + δ)− (γ + δ) ≥ t0(γ) +
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)dG(c | γ + δ). (60)
Adding the two inequalities and re–arranging terms yields:∫ ∞
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)1(−∞,cˆ0(γ))(c) + c dG(c | γ) ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)1(−∞,cˆ0(γ))(c) + c dG(c | γ + δ).(61)
Here, we have used γ =
∫∞
−∞
cdG(c | γ). Now notice that the integrand under the two integrals
is the same, increasing, and strictly increasing for c > cˆ0(γ). Hence, since G(c | γ + δ) first
order stochastically dominates G(c | γ), the first integral is strictly smaller than the second
one, a contradiction.
In a similar way, it can be shown that if there are γ, γ′ with γ < γ′ and α(γ) = 0, α(γ′) = 1,
then we must have that q¯(γ) = 1.
The previous two statements jointly imply that α can equal 1 only over an interval [γ1, γ2],
and q¯ is 1 (resp. 0) to the left (resp. right) of the interval. But this means that the allocation
is non–increasing, and this completes the proof of the “⇒”–part.
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“⇐”: We proceed in two steps. We first define transfers and then verify all incentive
constraints.
STEP 1: (i) For γ > γ2, we set for some constant τ ∈ R:
t¯(γ) = τ. (62)
(ii) For γ ∈ [γ1, γ2], we define t(γ, c) piece–wise constant:
t(γ, c) =


t0(γ) if c ≥ cˆ0(γ)
t1(γ) if c < cˆ0(γ)
, (63)
where t0 and t1 are defined by:
t0(γ2) = k −
∫ cˆ0(γ2)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ2)− c)dG(c | γ2) dc+ τ, (64)
t0(γ) = t0(γ2) +
∫ γ2
γ
cˆ′0(z)G(cˆ0(z) | z) dz, (65)
t1(γ) = t0(γ) + cˆ0(γ). (66)
(Note that cˆ′0 is well–defined for almost all γ since cˆ0 is decreasing by assumption.)
(iii) For γ < γ1, we define t¯(γ) equal to the constant t¯:
t¯(γ) = t¯ = t0(γ1)− k + γ1 +
∫ cˆ0(γ1)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ1)− c) dG(c | γ1). (67)
STEP 2: We now verify that (α, t¯, q¯, t, q) satisfies (AS1) and (MON2). By definition of a
non–increasing, deterministic allocation, q(γ, c) satisfies (MON2). To demonstrate (AS1), let
U˜(γˆ; γ) be defined as in (43). We have to show that
∆ ≡ U(γ)− U˜(γˆ; γ) ≥ 0 ∀γ, γˆ. (68)
Indeed, observe first that, by construction, transfers are continuous on Γ and differentiable with
respect to γ for all γ except at γ1 and γ2. Together with the fact that (α, q¯, q) is deterministic,
this implies that U and U˜ are continuous on Γ and differentiable almost everywhere. Hence,
with U(γˆ) = U˜(γˆ; γˆ), we can write
∆ = U(γ)− U(γˆ) + U˜(γˆ; γˆ)− U˜(γˆ; γ) =
∫ γ
γˆ
U ′(z) dz −
∫ γ
γˆ
∂U˜(γˆ, z)
∂γ
dz. (69)
Next, we compute U ′ and ∂U˜/∂γ. As for U ′, note that for γ ∈ (γ2, γ¯], we have U(γ) = τ ,
thus U ′(γ) = 0. For γ ∈ [0, γ1), we have U(γ) = t¯ − γ, thus U
′(γ) = −1. Finally, consider
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γ ∈ (γ1, γ2). Note that by the definition of transfers, U(γ) = t0(γ) +
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)dG(c | γ).
Hence, by Leibniz’ rule
U ′(γ) = t′0(γ) +
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
cˆ′0(γ) dG(c | γ) +
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
(cˆ0(γ)− c)
∂g(c | γ)
∂γ
dc. (70)
If we differentiate t0, we get t
′
0(γ) = −cˆ
′
0(γ)G(cˆ0(γ) | γ), which cancels with the second term in
(70). Now apply integration by parts on the third term in (70) to get
U ′(γ) = (cˆ0(γ)− c)
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
cˆ0(γ)
−∞
+
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
dc (71)
=
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
dc, (72)
where the second equality follows because limc→−∞ ∂G/∂γ(c | γ) = 0.
In sum, U ′ exists for all γ ∈ Γ except at γ1 and γ2. Because (α, q¯, q) is deterministic, we
can write U ′ as a function over the whole interval [0, γ¯] as
U ′(γ) = α(γ)
∫ ∞
−∞
q(γ, c)
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
dc− (1− α(γ))q¯(γ). (73)
Moreover, similar steps that we used to derive (49) yield that for all γ, γˆ:
∂U˜(γˆ; γ)
∂γ
= α(γˆ)
∫ ∞
−∞
q(γˆ, c)
∂G(c | γ)
∂γ
dc− (1− α(γˆ))q¯(γˆ). (74)
Therefore, we obtain
∆ =
∫ γ
γˆ
∫ +∞
−∞
[α(z)q(z, c)− α(γˆ)q(γˆ, c)]
∂G(c | z)
∂γ
dc dz (75)
−
∫ γ
γˆ
[(1− α(z))q¯(z)− (1− α(γˆ))q¯(γˆ)] dz. (76)
Now observe that in the independent case ∂G(c|z)/∂γ
g(c|z)
= −1. In the non–independent case, we
will assume
∫ ∂G(c|z)/∂γ
g(c|z)
dG(c | z) = −1 (see (34)). Therefore, the second line is
∫ γ
γˆ
∫ +∞
−∞
[(1 −
α(z))q¯(z)− (1− α(γˆ))q¯(γˆ)]∂G(c|z)/∂γ
g(c|z)
dG(c | z) dz, and re–arranging terms yields
∆ =
∫ γ
γˆ
∫ +∞
−∞
{[(1− α(z))q¯(z) + α(z)q(z, c)] (77)
−[(1− α(γˆ))q¯(γˆ) + α(γˆ)q(γˆ, c)]}
∂G(c | z)/∂γ
g(c | z)
dG(c | z) dz. (78)
We now show that ∆ is non–negative if γˆ < γ. Indeed, by assumption, (α, q¯, q) is deterministic
and non–increasing. This implies that (1 − α(z))q¯(z) + α(z)q(z, c) is non–increasing in z for
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all c. Therefore, with γˆ < γ, the term in the curly brackets under the integral is non–positive.
Recall also that first order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(· | γ)}γ implies ∂G/∂γ ≤ 0.
These two observations imply that the integrand is non–negative so that ∆ ≥ 0. For γˆ > γ,
the argument is analogous. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8 We begin with the proof of an auxiliary statement: The moral hazard
problem does not cause additional agency costs if and only if jointly:
∫ ∞
c0(γ∗1 )
[ψ(γ∗1 , c0(γ
∗
1))− ψ(γ
∗
1 , c)]h(γ
∗
1) dG(c | γ
∗
1) ≥ 0, (79)
∫ c0(γ∗2 )
−∞
[ψ(γ∗2 , c)− ψ(γ
∗
2 , c0(γ
∗
2))]h(γ
∗
2) dG(c | γ
∗
2) ≤ 0. (80)
To see this, recall that c0(γ) = v + ψ(γ, c0(γ))h(γ). Therefore, from (64) with τ = 0:
t∗0(γ
∗
2) = k −
∫ c0(γ∗2 )
−∞
(v − c+ ψ(γ∗2 , c0(γ
∗
2))h(γ
∗
2)) dG(c | γ
∗
2). (81)
By definition of γ∗2 , we have that k =
∫ c0(γ∗2 )
−∞
(v − c+ ψ(γ∗2 , c)h(γ)) dG(c | γ
∗
2). Hence,
t∗0(γ
∗
2) =
∫ c0(γ∗2 )
−∞
[ψ(γ∗2 , c)− ψ(γ
∗
2 , c0(γ
∗
2))]h(γ
∗
2) dG(c | γ
∗
2). (82)
A similar computation based on (67) and the definition of γ∗1 reveals that
t¯∗ − (c0(γ
∗
1) + t
∗
0(γ
∗
1)) = t¯
∗ − t∗1(γ
∗
1) =
∫ ∞
c0(γ∗1 )
[ψ(γ∗1 , c0(γ
∗
1))− ψ(γ
∗
1 , c)]h(γ
∗
1) dG(c | γ
∗
1). (83)
From (82) and (83) it then follows that (35) implies (79) and (80). To see the reverse, recall
that (65) implies t∗
′
0 (γ) = −c
′
0(γ)G(c0(γ) | γ) ≥ 0 (since c
′
0 ≤ 0 as shown in footnote 18).
Moreover, from (66) it follows t∗
′
1 (γ) = t
∗′
0 (γ) + c
′
0(γ) = (1 − G(c0(γ) | γ))c
′
0(γ) ≤ 0. In other
words, t∗0 is non–decreasing and t
∗
1 non–increasing in γ. Hence, (35) is actually equivalent to
t¯∗ ≥ t∗0(γ
∗
1)+c0(γ
∗
1) and t
∗
0(γ
∗
2) ≤ 0, which is implied by (79) and (80). This completes the proof
of the auxiliary statement.
By inspection of the integrands in (79) and (80), it can now easily be seen that the moral
hazard problem does not (does) cause agency costs if ∂ψ/∂c ≥ (<)0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9 (i) Fix γ. Since ∂JAI /∂p = −(1−G(p | γ)) < 0, J
A
I is strictly decreasing
in p. Moreover, for p→ −∞, JAI becomes unboundedly large, and for p→ +∞, J
A
I converges
to zero. Therefore, JAI = k has a unique solution pI(γ). The argument for i = II is similar.
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(ii) First order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(· | γ)}γ implies that J
A
I is increasing in
γ. Together with the fact that JAI is decreasing in p, this implies that pI is increasing in γ. The
argument for pII is analogous.
(ii) The claim follows since JAI is decreasing and J
A
II is increasing in p. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 10 We first show that there are transfers (t¯, t) so that (α, t¯, q¯, t, q) satisfies
(AS2), (AS1) if and only if (α, q¯, q) is non–increasing. The “only if”-part follows from Lemma
6 and the fact that (AS2) implies (MON2) (by Lemma 1). As for the “if”-part, suppose that
(α, q¯, q) is non–increasing. By Lemma 6, this implies (AS1) and (MON2) for the transfers
defined by (62)-(67). It is easy to verify that the resulting uI satisfies (13). Together with
(MON2) this implies (AS2) by Lemma 1.
Next, we turn to the moral hazard constraints. Given the transfers (62)-(67), the same
arguments that establish Lemma 7 demonstrate that the contract satisfies the moral hazard
constraints (MH) if and only if
t¯ ≥ cˆ0(γ) + t0(γ) and t0(γ) ≤ τ for all γ ∈ [γ1, γ2]. (84)
Because cˆ0 is non–increasing, it follows as in the proof of Lemma 8 that t0 is non–decreasing
and t1 non–increasing in γ. Therefore, the previous condition is actually equivalent to t¯ ≥
cˆ0(γ1) + t0(γ1) and t0(γ2) ≤ τ . Yet by definition of transfers and J
A
I , J
A
II , this is equivalent to
(39). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 11 Suppose, by contradiction, that c˜0 is not optimal, then there exists
some other schedule cˆ0 that satisfies the constraints in S and yields a strictly higher value for
its objective (40). In particular, since cˆ0 satisfies (39), we have cˆ0(γ) ∈ [pII(γ), pI(γ)] for γ ∈
{γ1, γ2}. Because cˆ0 is non–increasing, it also follows pI(γ1) ≥ cˆ0(γ1) ≥ cˆ0(γ) ≥ cˆ0(γ2) ≥ pII(γ2)
for all γ ∈ [γ1, γ2]. Hence, pI(γ1) ≥ pII(γ2) and cˆ0(γ) ∈ [pII(γ2), pI(γ1)] for all γ ∈ [γ1, γ2].
Define the sets
Γ+ ≡ {γ ∈ [γ1, γ2] | cˆ0(γ) > c˜0(γ)} and Γ
− ≡ {γ ∈ [γ1, γ2] | cˆ0(γ) < c˜0(γ)}.
If γ ∈ Γ+, then, due to cˆ0(γ) ∈ [pII(γ2), pI(γ1)], we must have c˜0(γ) < pI(γ1), which is only
the case if c0(γ) < pI(γ1). Hence, γ ∈ Γ
+ implies cˆ0(γ) > c˜0(γ) ≥ c0(γ). By the definition of c0
this then implies v− c+ψ(γ, c)h(γ) < 0 for all c ∈ (c˜0(γ), cˆ0(γ)). Similar arguments show that
γ ∈ Γ− implies v − c+ ψ(γ, c)h(γ) > 0 for all c ∈ (cˆ0(γ), c˜0(γ)).
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The difference in the objective (40) between the schedule cˆ0(γ) and c˜0(γ) is
∫
γ∈Γ+
∫ cˆ0(γ)
c˜0(γ)
(v − c+ ψ(γ, c)h(γ))dG(c|γ)dγ +
∫
γ∈Γ−
∫ c˜0(γ)
cˆ0(γ)
(c− v − ψ(γ, c)h(γ))dG(c|γ)dγ (85)
The terms under the integrands are all negative so that we obtain the contradiction that (40)
is weakly smaller for cˆ0 than for c˜0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 We show that any solution to problem S exhibits γ1 ≥ γ
∗
1 and
γ2 ≤ γ
∗
2 . By contradiction, suppose the optimal contract with cut–off cˆ0 has γ1 < γ
∗
1 . Consider
the alternative contract which differs from the optimal contract only in that q¯ = 1 on [γ1, γ
∗
1 ],
that is, its cut–off cˆ†0 takes on the same values as cˆ0 but its domain is [γ
∗
1 , γ2]. We derive a
contradiction by showing that the alternative contract is feasible and yields the principal more
than the optimal contract.
As for feasibility, recall that pi, i = I, II is increasing in γ. Because cˆ0 satisfies (39) and is
non–increasing, this implies that the whole graph of cˆ0 is in P . Hence, also the whole graph of
cˆ†0 is in P , in particular cˆ
†
0 satisfies (39), which establishes feasibility.
To complete the argument, notice the two contracts yield the same virtual surplus except
in the range [γ1, γ
∗
1). The payoff difference between the alternative and the optimal contract is
∫ γ∗1
γ1
v − γ − h(γ)dF (γ)−
∫ γ∗1
γ1
[
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
v − c+ ψ(c, γ)h(γ) dG(c | γ)− k]dF (γ). (86)
By the definition of c0 and γ
∗
1 we have the following ordering of virtual surpluses for γ ∈ [γ1, γ
∗
1):
v − γ − h(γ) >
∫ c0(γ)
−∞
[v − c + ψ(c, γ)h(γ)dG(c | γ)− k (87)
≥
∫ cˆ0(γ)
−∞
[v − c + ψ(c, γ)h(γ)dG(c | γ)− k. (88)
Hence, the alternative contract yields the principal a higher profit than the optimal contract,
a contradiction. The argument for γ2 ≤ γ
∗
2 is symmetric. Q.E.D.
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